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1 reasoning process
————————Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > reasoning process
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2 reasoning
nounthe act or process of reaching a decision, conclusion etc:تَفْكير، حُجَج وبراهينI don't understand his reasoning at all.
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3 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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4 razonamiento
m.reasoning.* * *1 reasoning* * *noun m.* * *SM reasoning* * *masculino reasoning* * *= argument, reasoning, loop, ratio decidendi, argumentation.Ex. A précis is an account which restricts itself to the essential points in an argument.Ex. If scientific reasoning were limited to the logical processes of arithmetic, we should not get far in our understanding of the physical world.Ex. Orr's loop and propositions are useful to consider here.Ex. An online search of the WESTLAW and LEXIS databases, and examination of numerous cases with potential precedential value found the many dicta in judicial opinions to differ among jurisdictions, and found no ratio decidendi at all.Ex. The burden of proof is a key element in dialectic argumentation but turn-taking eventually determines the winner of an argument.----* basarse en razonamientos + Adjetivo = rest on + Adjetivo + grounds.* capacidad de razonamiento = thinking skills.* proceso de razonamiento = reasoning process.* razonamiento comercial = business case.* * *masculino reasoning* * *= argument, reasoning, loop, ratio decidendi, argumentation.Ex: A précis is an account which restricts itself to the essential points in an argument.
Ex: If scientific reasoning were limited to the logical processes of arithmetic, we should not get far in our understanding of the physical world.Ex: Orr's loop and propositions are useful to consider here.Ex: An online search of the WESTLAW and LEXIS databases, and examination of numerous cases with potential precedential value found the many dicta in judicial opinions to differ among jurisdictions, and found no ratio decidendi at all.Ex: The burden of proof is a key element in dialectic argumentation but turn-taking eventually determines the winner of an argument.* basarse en razonamientos + Adjetivo = rest on + Adjetivo + grounds.* capacidad de razonamiento = thinking skills.* proceso de razonamiento = reasoning process.* razonamiento comercial = business case.* * *reasoning* * *
razonamiento sustantivo masculino
reasoning
razonamiento sustantivo masculino reasoning
' razonamiento' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
argumento
- elemental
- coherente
- cojo
- sólido
English:
confusing
- reasoning
- argument
- assumption
- bear
* * *razonamiento nmreasoning* * *m reasoning* * *razonamiento nm: reasoning -
5 proceso
m.1 process.el proceso creativo the creative processel paciente está en un proceso de recuperación the patient is in the process of recovering2 trial (law) (juicio).abrir un proceso contra to bring an action against3 processing (computing) (procesamiento).4 course of action.5 industrial process, process.pres.indicat.1st person singular (yo) present indicative of spanish verb: procesar.* * *1 (gen) process2 (en el tiempo) time3 DERECHO trial\proceso de datos data processing* * *noun m.1) process2) prosecution, trial* * *SM1) (=desarrollo) (tb Anat, Quím) processel proceso de una enfermedad — the course o progress of a disease
2) (Med)3) (=transcurso) lapse of time4) (Jur) (=juicio) trial; (=pleito) lawsuit, proceedings plabrir o entablar proceso — to bring a suit (a against)
proceso verbal — (=escrito) record; (=audiencia) hearing
5) (Inform) processing* * *1)a) (serie de acciones, sucesos) processb) (Med)es una enfermedad de proceso lento — it is a long, drawn-out illness
2) (Der) trial3) (Inf) processing4) ( transcurso) course* * *= operation, process, processing, routine.Ex. With the advent of micro-computers even much smaller cataloguing operations can effectively be computerised.Ex. The organisation of knowledge is a process that has been recognised as necessary for thousands of years.Ex. Often, the computer is used to aid in the processing of such indexes, and sometimes computer processing is responsible for the creation of multiple entries from one string of index terms.Ex. Chain indexing is a simple mechanical routine for generating a limited number of index entries for a subject.----* acelerar el proceso de deterioro = hasten + rot.* acelerar un proceso = hasten + process.* activar un proceso = activate + process.* centro especializado de proceso de información = clearinghouse [clearing house].* departamento de procesos técnicos = processing department.* emprender un proceso de = set on + a course of.* empresa dedicada al proceso del cereal = corn processor.* en el proceso = in the process.* en proceso = in progress.* en proceso de = in the midst of, in course of.* en proceso de cambio = changing.* en proceso de construcción = under construction.* en proceso de envejecimiento = aging [ageing].* en proceso de remodelación = under renovation.* en proceso de transmisión = in transit.* estación de proceso = processing station.* estándar de proceso = processing standard.* estar en proceso de = be on the way to, be in the process of, be in the course of.* estar en proceso de cambio = be in flux.* estar en proceso de + Infinitivo = be on to + Infinitivo.* evaluación de procesos = process rating.* Ley de Simplificación de los Procesos Administrativos = Paperwork Reduction Act.* número de tarjeta de proceso = transaction card number.* pasar por un proceso de = go through + a process of.* personal de proceso de datos = operation staff.* proceso automático = automatic process.* proceso bicromático = bichromate process.* proceso comunicativo = communication process.* proceso de acreditación = accreditation process.* proceso de aprendizaje = learning process.* proceso de asignación de presupuestos = budgetary process.* proceso de búsqueda = searching process, search process.* proceso de cambio = process of change.* proceso de catalogación = cataloguing procedure.* proceso de catalogación, el = cataloguing process, the.* proceso de conexión = logon.* proceso de datos = data processing, transaction processing.* proceso de descafeinar = decaffeination.* proceso de envejecimiento = aging process.* proceso de evaluación = review process, evaluation process.* proceso de formación = instructional process.* proceso de fotolito = photolitho process.* proceso de homologación = accreditation process.* proceso de impresión = printing process.* proceso de indización = indexing process.* proceso de paz = peace process.* proceso de pedidos = order processing.* proceso de razonamiento = reasoning process.* proceso de reclamación = appeals process.* proceso de recuperación = retrieval process.* proceso de referencia = referral process.* proceso de referencia, el = reference process, the.* proceso de reforma = reform process.* proceso de selección = screening process, selection process.* proceso de trabajo = work process.* proceso de transferencia de la información = information transfer process.* proceso de transformación = transformation process.* proceso educativo = educative process, instructional process.* proceso electoral = electoral process.* proceso en paralelo = parallel processing.* proceso en primera instancia = proceeding in the first instance.* proceso fotográfico = photographic process.* proceso fotolitográfico = photolithographic process.* proceso histórico = history-making process.* proceso judicial = adjudicatory proceeding, proceeding, prosecution.* proceso judicial ante jurado = jury trial.* proceso lineal = linear process.* proceso mental = thought process.* proceso penal = criminal proceeding.* proceso por lotes = batch processing.* proceso presupuestario = budgeting process.* proceso rutinario = routine.* proceso técnico = processing, technical process.* proceso técnico del libro = book preparation, book processing.* prototipo para el proceso de datos = data modelling.* sistema de proceso de datos = data processing system.* sistema de proceso de imágenes = imaging system.* tarjeta de proceso = transaction card.* técnico encargado del proceso de datos = data-processing professional.* tiempo de proceso = processing time.* * *1)a) (serie de acciones, sucesos) processb) (Med)es una enfermedad de proceso lento — it is a long, drawn-out illness
2) (Der) trial3) (Inf) processing4) ( transcurso) course* * *= operation, process, processing, routine.Ex: With the advent of micro-computers even much smaller cataloguing operations can effectively be computerised.
Ex: The organisation of knowledge is a process that has been recognised as necessary for thousands of years.Ex: Often, the computer is used to aid in the processing of such indexes, and sometimes computer processing is responsible for the creation of multiple entries from one string of index terms.Ex: Chain indexing is a simple mechanical routine for generating a limited number of index entries for a subject.* acelerar el proceso de deterioro = hasten + rot.* acelerar un proceso = hasten + process.* activar un proceso = activate + process.* centro especializado de proceso de información = clearinghouse [clearing house].* departamento de procesos técnicos = processing department.* emprender un proceso de = set on + a course of.* empresa dedicada al proceso del cereal = corn processor.* en el proceso = in the process.* en proceso = in progress.* en proceso de = in the midst of, in course of.* en proceso de cambio = changing.* en proceso de construcción = under construction.* en proceso de envejecimiento = aging [ageing].* en proceso de remodelación = under renovation.* en proceso de transmisión = in transit.* estación de proceso = processing station.* estándar de proceso = processing standard.* estar en proceso de = be on the way to, be in the process of, be in the course of.* estar en proceso de cambio = be in flux.* estar en proceso de + Infinitivo = be on to + Infinitivo.* evaluación de procesos = process rating.* Ley de Simplificación de los Procesos Administrativos = Paperwork Reduction Act.* número de tarjeta de proceso = transaction card number.* pasar por un proceso de = go through + a process of.* personal de proceso de datos = operation staff.* proceso automático = automatic process.* proceso bicromático = bichromate process.* proceso comunicativo = communication process.* proceso de acreditación = accreditation process.* proceso de aprendizaje = learning process.* proceso de asignación de presupuestos = budgetary process.* proceso de búsqueda = searching process, search process.* proceso de cambio = process of change.* proceso de catalogación = cataloguing procedure.* proceso de catalogación, el = cataloguing process, the.* proceso de conexión = logon.* proceso de datos = data processing, transaction processing.* proceso de descafeinar = decaffeination.* proceso de envejecimiento = aging process.* proceso de evaluación = review process, evaluation process.* proceso de formación = instructional process.* proceso de fotolito = photolitho process.* proceso de homologación = accreditation process.* proceso de impresión = printing process.* proceso de indización = indexing process.* proceso de paz = peace process.* proceso de pedidos = order processing.* proceso de razonamiento = reasoning process.* proceso de reclamación = appeals process.* proceso de recuperación = retrieval process.* proceso de referencia = referral process.* proceso de referencia, el = reference process, the.* proceso de reforma = reform process.* proceso de selección = screening process, selection process.* proceso de trabajo = work process.* proceso de transferencia de la información = information transfer process.* proceso de transformación = transformation process.* proceso educativo = educative process, instructional process.* proceso electoral = electoral process.* proceso en paralelo = parallel processing.* proceso en primera instancia = proceeding in the first instance.* proceso fotográfico = photographic process.* proceso fotolitográfico = photolithographic process.* proceso histórico = history-making process.* proceso judicial = adjudicatory proceeding, proceeding, prosecution.* proceso judicial ante jurado = jury trial.* proceso lineal = linear process.* proceso mental = thought process.* proceso penal = criminal proceeding.* proceso por lotes = batch processing.* proceso presupuestario = budgeting process.* proceso rutinario = routine.* proceso técnico = processing, technical process.* proceso técnico del libro = book preparation, book processing.* prototipo para el proceso de datos = data modelling.* sistema de proceso de datos = data processing system.* sistema de proceso de imágenes = imaging system.* tarjeta de proceso = transaction card.* técnico encargado del proceso de datos = data-processing professional.* tiempo de proceso = processing time.* * *A1 (serie de acciones, sucesos) processsu recuperación será un proceso largo y complicado his recovery will be a long and complicated processun proceso natural/químico a natural/chemical processel proceso de paz the peace processproceso de selección selection procedure or process2 ( Med):sufre un proceso de insuficiencia respiratoria he has a respiratory complaintB ( Der) trialse le sigue proceso por robo she is being tried on a charge of theft, she is on trial for theftno se mencionó en el proceso it was not mentioned during the trialCompuestos:criminal proceedings (pl)written report, procès verbalC ( Inf) processingCompuesto:proceso de datos/textosdata/text processingD (transcurso) courseen el proceso de tres meses in the course of three months, over a period of three monthsE ( Pol)* * *
Del verbo procesar: ( conjugate procesar)
proceso es:
1ª persona singular (yo) presente indicativo
procesó es:
3ª persona singular (él/ella/usted) pretérito indicativo
Multiple Entries:
procesar
proceso
procesar ( conjugate procesar) verbo transitivo
1 (Der) to try, prosecute
2 ‹materia prima/datos/solicitud› to process
proceso sustantivo masculino
1 (serie de acciones, sucesos) process
2 (Der) trial
3 (Inf) processing;◊ proceso de datos/textos data/word processing
4 ( transcurso) course
procesar verbo transitivo
1 Jur to prosecute
2 (información, productos) to process
proceso sustantivo masculino
1 process: el proceso de elaboración del vino, the winemaking process
2 (transcurso de tiempo) course
en el proceso de un año, in the course of a year
3 Inform processing
4 Jur trial, proceedings
' proceso' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
causa
- estancar
- estancarse
- formativa
- formativo
- fundición
- iniciar
- producción
- seguimiento
- tránsito
- tratar
- acelerar
- activar
- adaptación
- agilizar
- anestesia
- apertura
- aprendizaje
- apresurar
- atasco
- burocrático
- caries
- controlar
- criba
- decadencia
- detener
- enlatado
- estacionar
- frenar
- ir
- medio
- mezcla
- obstruir
- retrasar
- tardado
- trabar
- trámite
English:
accelerate
- bath
- casting
- CPU
- data processing
- deliberation
- economic
- eventual
- inhibit
- institute
- insulation
- lengthy
- printing
- process
- prosecution
- robotization
- short-circuit
- smooth
- speed
- speed up
- stall
- stop
- streamlined
- study
- test
- thought process
- toilet-training
- trial
- work out
- break
- elimination
- suggestion
* * *proceso nm1. [fenómeno, operación] process;el proceso de paz the peace process;el proceso de fabricación de la cerveza the process of brewing beer;el paciente está en un proceso de recuperación the patient is in the process of recoveringproceso de fabricación manufacturing process2. [transcurso, intervalo] course;se esperan grandes cambios en el proceso de un año great changes are expected in the course of the year[causa] lawsuit;abrir un proceso contra alguien to bring an action against sbproceso civil civil action proceso por lotes batch processing;proceso subordinado background process;proceso de textos word processing6. RP Polel Proceso [dictadura] = military dictatorship in Uruguay (1973-85) or Argentina (1976-1983)* * *m1 ( procedimiento) process;proceso de paz peace process2 JUR trial3 INFOR:proceso de datos/textos data/word processing* * *proceso nm1) : process2) : trial, proceedings pl* * *proceso n1. (en general) process2. (enjuiciamiento) trial -
6 démarche
démarche [demaʀ∫]feminine nouna. ( = façon de marcher) walkb. ( = intervention) step* * *demaʀʃ1) ( allure) walk2) ( tentative) stepfaire or tenter une démarche auprès de quelqu'un — to approach somebody
démarche commune or collective — joint representation
3) ( attitude) approach4) ( raisonnement) reasoning; ( évolution)* * *demaʀʃ nf1) (= allure) walk, gaitIl a une drôle de démarche. — He's got a funny walk.
2) (= intervention) step3) (manière d'aborder un problème, un projet) approach* * *démarche nf1 ( allure) walk; démarche bizarre funny walk; avoir une démarche assurée/lourde to walk with a confident/heavy step; avoir une démarche de canard to waddle like a duck;2 ( tentative) step; mes démarches pour adopter un enfant the steps I took to adopt a child; sa démarche auprès du ministre a abouti the approaches he made to the minister were successful; entreprendre des démarches auprès de qn to apply to sb; faire or tenter une démarche auprès de qn to approach sb; faire des démarches pour obtenir qch to take steps to obtain sth; multiplier les démarches pour sauvegarder la paix to step up peace initiatives; démarche commune or collective joint representation (auprès de to); les démarches nécessaires the appropriate steps; aider qn dans ses démarches auprès de l'administration to help sb deal with officialdom; plusieurs démarches sont possibles there are several possible courses of action; les démarches à effectuer sont les suivantes the correct procedure is as follows;3 ( attitude) approach; la démarche homéopathique the homœopathic approach;4 ( raisonnement) reasoning; ( évolution) démarche de la pensée/du raisonnement thought/reasoning process; analyser la démarche par laquelle l'enfant apprend à parler to analyse the process by which a child learns to speak; démarche de l'analyse analytical methodology.démarche qualité Entr total quality control.[demarʃ] nom fémininavoir une démarche gracieuse to have a graceful gait, to walk gracefullydémarches administratives/juridiques administrative/legal procedures3. [approche - d'un problème] approach -
7 argument
noun1) (reason) Begründung, diearguments for/against something — Argumente für/gegen etwas
assume something for argument's sake — etwas rein theoretisch annehmen
3) (debate) Auseinandersetzung, dieget into an argument/get into arguments with somebody — mit jemandem in Streit geraten
* * *1) (a quarrel or unfriendly discussion: They are having an argument about/over whose turn it is.) der Streit2) (a set of reasons; a piece of reasoning: The argument for/against going; a philosophical argument.) die Beweisführung* * *ar·gu·ment[ˈɑ:gjəmənt, AM ˈɑ:rg-]nwithout any \argument ohne weitere Diskussionento be engaged in \argument in eine Auseinandersetzung verwickelt seinto get into/have an \argument [with sb] [mit jdm] streitenthere's a strong \argument for banning cars from the city centre es spricht einiges dafür, Autos aus der Innenstadt zu verbannen\argument of a book These f eines Buches\argument separator Argumenttrennzeichen nt* * *['Aːgjʊmənt]n1) (= discussion) Diskussion fto spend hours in argument about how to do sth — stundenlang darüber diskutieren, wie man etw macht
he just said that for the sake of argument — das hat er nur gesagt, um etwas (dagegen) zu sagen
2) (= quarrel) Auseinandersetzung fto have an argument — sich streiten; (over sth trivial) sich zanken
first state your theory, then list the arguments for and against — stellen Sie erst Ihre These auf und nennen Sie dann die Gründe und Gegengründe
of private education —
there's an even stronger argument than that that's not a rational argument, it's just a dogmatic assertion — es gibt ein noch stärkeres Argument das ist kein rationales Argument, das ist bloß eine dogmatische Behauptung
5) (= statement of proof) Beweis mProfessor Ayer's argument is that... —
the Ontological/Teleological Argument — der ontologische/teleologische Gottesbeweis
all the various arguments for the existence of a god — all die verschiedenen Gottesbeweise
I don't think that's a valid argument — ich glaube, das ist kein gültiger Beweis
* * *argument [ˈɑː(r)ɡjʊmənt] sbeyond argument einwandfrei2. Argumentation f, Beweisführung f:argument from design PHIL teleologischer Gottesbeweis3. Erörterung f, Debatte f:hold an argument diskutieren;settle a dispute by argument einen Streit mit Worten beilegen4. obs Streitfrage fclosing arguments Schlussanträge6. Wortwechsel m, Auseinandersetzung f:get into an argument sich in die Haare geraten, in Streit geraten ( beide:with mit;about über akk, wegen);have an argument Streit haben;start an argument with sb sich mit jemandem anlegen;without argument widerspruchslos7. Thema n, Gegenstand m8. Kurzfassung f, Zusammenfassung f9. MATH Argument n (unabhängige Veränderliche einer Funktion)* * *noun1) (reason) Begründung, diearguments for/against something — Argumente für/gegen etwas
3) (debate) Auseinandersetzung, dieget into an argument/get into arguments with somebody — mit jemandem in Streit geraten
* * *n.Argument -e n.Auseinandersetzung f.Diskussion f.Wortwechsel m. -
8 proceso de razonamiento
(n.) = reasoning processEx. An ES consists of a knowledge base plus an 'inference engine' containing reasoning processes and problem solutions.* * *(n.) = reasoning processEx: An ES consists of a knowledge base plus an 'inference engine' containing reasoning processes and problem solutions.
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9 Emotion
.. propose that reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were, that emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better.The strategies of human reason probably did not develop, in either evolution or any single individual, without the guiding force of the mechanisms of biological regulation, of which emotion and feeling are notable expressions. Moreover, even after reasoning strategies become established in the formative years, their effective deployment probably depends, to a considerable extent, on a continued ability to experience feelings.This is not to deny that emotions and feelings can cause havoc in the processes of reasoning under certain circumstances. Traditional wisdom has told us that they can, and recent investigations of the normal reasoning process also reveal the potentially harmful influence of emotional biases. It is thus even more surprising and novel that the absence of emotion and feeling is no less damaging, no less capable of compromising the rationality that makes us distinctly human and allows us to decide in consonance with a sense of personal future, social convention, and moral principle. (Damasio, 1994, p. xii)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Emotion
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10 גמרא
גְּמָרָאf. (v. גְּמַר II, 5) memorizing of verbal teachings, tradition. Ab. Zar.19a bot. הנ״מ סברא אבל ג׳ מחד רבאוכ׳ (v. Rabb. D. S. a. l. note) this refers to reasoning (dialectics), but as to traditional laws (rules), it is better to study only with one teacher, in order not to be confused by varying wording; Yalk. Ps. 614.Gitt.6b הא ג׳ היא וג׳ לא שמיע ליה this is merely a tradition (not to be arrived at by way of reasoning) and one may not have heard that tradition (and yet be an able man). B. Mets. 33ab ג׳ verbal study (opp. to משנה which had been put to writing). Arakh.29a רב גַּמְרֵיה גמיר (not גמור) Rab had his own tradition about it (had it from his teacher that the Mishnah was corrupt). Erub.60a ג׳ גמור זמורתא תהא if it is a tradition, learn it by heart, let it be like a song (the wording of which you dare not change); Sabb.106b; Ab. Zar.32b; Bets.24a (variously interpreted in comment.).Yoma 14b, a. fr. משמיה דג׳ as a tradition (without knowing the reasoning process, cmp. ib. 33a bot. ג׳ גמירנאוכ׳); a. fr. Gmara, that part of the Talmud containing those discussions, decisions which, after the reduction to writing of the Mishnah, were the materials of verbal studies until they, too, were put to writing.Abbrev. גמ׳, a clerical mark in the Talmnd Babli editions, to indicate where the Mishnah ends, and the Gmara begins. -
11 גְּמָרָא
גְּמָרָאf. (v. גְּמַר II, 5) memorizing of verbal teachings, tradition. Ab. Zar.19a bot. הנ״מ סברא אבל ג׳ מחד רבאוכ׳ (v. Rabb. D. S. a. l. note) this refers to reasoning (dialectics), but as to traditional laws (rules), it is better to study only with one teacher, in order not to be confused by varying wording; Yalk. Ps. 614.Gitt.6b הא ג׳ היא וג׳ לא שמיע ליה this is merely a tradition (not to be arrived at by way of reasoning) and one may not have heard that tradition (and yet be an able man). B. Mets. 33ab ג׳ verbal study (opp. to משנה which had been put to writing). Arakh.29a רב גַּמְרֵיה גמיר (not גמור) Rab had his own tradition about it (had it from his teacher that the Mishnah was corrupt). Erub.60a ג׳ גמור זמורתא תהא if it is a tradition, learn it by heart, let it be like a song (the wording of which you dare not change); Sabb.106b; Ab. Zar.32b; Bets.24a (variously interpreted in comment.).Yoma 14b, a. fr. משמיה דג׳ as a tradition (without knowing the reasoning process, cmp. ib. 33a bot. ג׳ גמירנאוכ׳); a. fr. Gmara, that part of the Talmud containing those discussions, decisions which, after the reduction to writing of the Mishnah, were the materials of verbal studies until they, too, were put to writing.Abbrev. גמ׳, a clerical mark in the Talmnd Babli editions, to indicate where the Mishnah ends, and the Gmara begins. -
12 denktrant
n. reasoning, process of drawing conclusions, process of making inferences through logical thinking -
13 inductive
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14 Thinking
But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)[E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking
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15 λόγος
λόγος, ὁ, verbal noun of λέγω (B), with senses corresponding to λέγω (B) II and III (on the various senses of the word v. Theo Sm.pp.72,73 H., An.Ox.4.327): common in all periods in Prose and Verse, exc. Epic, in which it is found in signf. derived from λέγω (B) 111, cf.infr. VI. 1 a:1 account of money handled,σανίδες εἰς ἃς τὸν λ. ἀναγράφομεν IG12.374.191
; ἐδίδοσαν τὸν λ. ib.232.2;λ. δώσεις τῶν μετεχείρισας χρημάτων Hdt.3.142
, cf. 143;οὔτε χρήματα διαχειρίσας τῆς πόλεως δίδωμι λ. αὐτῶν οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἄρξας οὐδεμίαν εὐθύνας ὑπέχω νῦν αὐτῆς Lys.24.26
;λ. ἀπενεγκεῖν Arist.Ath.54.1
;ἐν ταῖς εὐθύναις τοῦ τοιούτου λ. ὑπεχέτω Pl.Lg. 774b
;τὸν τῶν χρημάτων λ. παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν D.8.47
;ἀδικήματα εἰς ἀργυρίου λ. ἀνήκοντα Din.1.60
; συνᾶραι λόγον μετά τινος settle accounts with, Ev.Matt.18.23, etc.; δεύτεροι λ. a second audit, Cod.Just.1.4.26.1; ὁ τραπεζιτικὸς λ. banking account, Theo Sm.p.73 H.: metaph.,οὐκ ἂν πριαίμην οὐδενὸς λ. βροτόν S.Aj. 477
.b public accounts, i. e. branch of treasury, ἴδιος λ., in Egypt, OGI188.2, 189.3, 669.38; also as title of treasurer, ib.408.4, Str.17.1.12;ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν λ. IPE2.29
A ([place name] Panticapaeum); δημόσιος λ., = Lat. fiscus, OGI669.21 (Egypt, i A.D.), etc. (but later, = aerarium, Cod.Just.1.5.15); alsoΚαίσαρος λ. OGI669.30
; κυριακὸς λ. ib.18.2 generally, account, reckoning, μὴ φῦναι τὸν ἅπαντα νικᾷ λ. excels the whole account, i.e. is best of all, S.OC 1225 (lyr.); δόντας λ. τῶν ἐποίησαν accounting for, i.e. paying the penalty for their doings, Hdt.8.100;λ. αἰτεῖν Pl.Plt. 285e
;λ. δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι Id.Prt. 336c
, al.;λαμβάνειν λ. καὶ ἐλέγχειν Id.Men. 75d
;παρασχεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων λ. Id.R. 344d
;λ. ἀπαιτεῖν D.30.15
, cf. Arist. EN 1104a3; λ. ὑπέχειν, δοῦναι, D.19.95;λ. ἐγγράψαι Id.24.199
, al.;λ. ἀποφέρειν τῇ πόλει Aeschin.3.22
, cf. Eu. Luc.16.2, Ep.Hebr.13.17;τὸ παράδοξον τῶν συμβεβηκότων ὑπὸ λόγον ἄγειν Plb.15.34.2
; λ. ἡ ἐπιστήμη, πολλὰ δὲ ὁ λ. the account is manifold, Plot.6.9.4; ἔχων λόγον τοῦ διὰ τί an account of the cause, Arist.APo. 74b27; ἐς λ. τινός on account of,ἐς χρημάτων λ. Th.3.46
, cf. Plb.5.89.6, LXX 2 Ma1.14, JRS 18.152 ([place name] Jerash); λόγῳ c. gen., by way of, Cod.Just.3.2.5. al.; κατὰ λόγον τοῦ μεγέθους if we take into account his size, Arist.HA 517b27;πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν ὁ λ. Ep.Hebr.4.13
, cf. D.Chr.31.123.3 measure, tale (cf. infr. 11.1),θάλασσα.. μετρέεται ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν λ. ὁκοῖος πρόσθεν Heraclit.31
;ψυχῆς ἐστι λ. ἑαυτὸν αὔξων Id.115
; ἐς τούτου (sc. γήραος) λ. οὐ πολλοί τινες ἀπικνέονται to the point of old age, Hdt.3.99, cf.7.9.β; ὁ ξύμπας λ. the full tale, Th.7.56, cf. Ep.Phil.4.15; κοινῷ λ. νομίσαντα common measure, Pl.Lg. 746e; sum, total of expenditure, IG42(1).103.151 (Epid., iv B.C.); ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λ., = Lat. patrimonii modus, Cod.Just.1.5.12.20.4 esteem, consideration, value put on a person or thing (cf. infr. VI. 2 d), οὗ πλείων λ. ἢ τῶν ἄλλων who is of more worth than all the rest, Heraclit.39; βροτῶν λ. οὐκ ἔσχεν οὐδέν' A.Pr. 233;οὐ σμικροῦ λ. S.OC 1163
: freq. in Hdt.,Μαρδονίου λ. οὐδεὶς γίνεται 8.102
;τῶν ἦν ἐλάχιστος ἀπολλυμένων λ. 4.135
, cf. E.Fr.94;περὶ ἐμοῦ οὐδεὶς λ. Ar.Ra.87
; λόγου οὐδενὸς γίνεσθαι πρός τινος to be of no account, repute with.., Hdt.1.120, cf.4.138; λόγου ποιήσασθαί τινα make one of account, Id.1.33; ἐλαχίστου, πλείστου λ. εἶναι, to be highly, lowly esteemed, Id.1.143, 3.146; but also λόγον τινὸς ποιεῖσθαι, like Lat. rationem habere alicujus, make account of, set a value on, Democr.187, etc.: usu. in neg. statements,οὐδένα λ. ποιήσασθαί τινος Hdt.1.4
, cf. 13, Plb.21.14.9, etc.;λ. ἔχειν Hdt.1.62
, 115;λ. ἴσχειν περί τινος Pl.Ti. 87c
;λ. ἔχειν περὶ τοὺς ποιητάς Lycurg.107
;λ. ἔχειν τινός D.18.199
, Arist.EN 1102b32, Plu.Phil.18 (but also, have the reputation of.., v. infr. VI. 2 e);ἐν οὐδενὶ λ. ποιήσασθαί τι Hdt.3.50
; ἐν οὐδενὶ λ. ἀπώλοντο without regard, Id.9.70;ἐν σμικρῷ λ. εἶναι Pl.R. 550a
; ὑμεῖς οὔτ' ἐν λ. οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ Orac. ap. Sch.Theoc.14.48; ἐν ἀνδρῶν λ. [εἶναι] to be reckoned, count as a man, Hdt.3.120; ἐν ἰδιώτεω λόγῳ καὶ ἀτίμου reckoned as.., Eus.Mynd.Fr. 59;σεμνὸς εἰς ἀρετῆς λ. καὶ δόξης D.19.142
.II relation, correspondence, proportion,1 generally, ὑπερτερίης λ. relation (of gold to lead), Thgn.418 = 1164;πρὸς λόγον τοῦ σήματος A.Th. 519
; κατὰ λόγον προβαίνοντες τιμῶσι in inverse ratio, Hdt.1.134, cf. 7.36;κατὰ λ. τῆς ἀποφορῆς Id.2.109
; τἄλλα κατὰ λ. in like fashion, Hp.VM16, Prog.17: c. gen., κατὰ λ. τῶν πρόσθεν ib. 24;κατὰ λ. τῶν ἡμερῶν Ar. Nu. 619
;κατὰ λ. τῆς δυνάμεως X. Cyr.8.6.11
;ἐλάττω ἢ κατὰ λ. Arist. HA 508a2
, cf. PA 671a18;ἐκ ταύτης ἐγένετο ἐκείνη κατὰ λ. Id.Pol. 1257a31
; cf. εὔλογος: sts. with ὁ αὐτός added, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λ. τῷ τείχεϊ in fashion like to.., Hdt.1.186; περὶ τῶν νόσων ὁ αὐτὸς λ. analogously, Pl.Tht. 158d, cf. Prm. 136b, al.; εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λ. similarly, Id.R. 353d; κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λ. in the same ratio, IG12.76.8; by parity of reasoning, Pl.Cra. 393c, R. 610a, al.; ἀνὰ λόγον τινός, τινί, Id.Ti. 29c, Alc.2.145d; τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν λ. πρὸς.. ὃν ἡ παιδεία πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν is related to.. as.., Procl.in Euc.p.20 F., al.2 Math., ratio, proportion (ὁ κατ' ἀνάλογον λ., λ. τῆς ἀναλογίας, Theo Sm.p.73 H.), Pythag. 2;ἰσότης λόγων Arist.EN 113a31
;λ. ἐστὶ δύο μεγεθῶν ἡ κατὰ πηλικότητα ποιὰ σχέσις Euc.5
Def.3;τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τοὺς λ. Arist.Metaph. 985b32
, cf. 1092b14; λόγοι ἀριθμῶν numerical ratios, Aristox.Harm.p.32 M.; τοὺς φθόγγους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἀριθμοῦ λ. λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους to be expressed in numerical ratios, Euc.Sect.Can. Proëm.: in Metre, ratio between arsis and thesis, by which the rhythm is defined, Aristox.Harm.p.34 M.;ἐὰν ᾖ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις, λύεται ὁ λ. Arist.de An. 424a31
; ἀνὰ λόγον analogically, Archyt.2; ἀνὰ λ. μερισθεῖσα [ἡ ψυχή] proportionally, Pl. Ti. 37a; soκατὰ λ. Men.319.6
; πρὸς λόγον in proportion, Plb.6.30.3, 9.15.3 (but πρὸς λόγον ἐπὶ στενὸν συνάγεται narrows uniformly, Sor. 1.9, cf. Diocl.Fr.171);ἐπὶ λόγον IG5(1).1428
([place name] Messene).3 Gramm., analogy, rule, τῷ λ. τῶν μετοχικῶν, τῆς συγκοπῆς, by the rule of the participles, of syncope, Choerob. in Theod.1.75 Gaisf., 1.377 H.;εἰπέ μοι τὸν λ. τοῦ Αἴας Αἴαντος, τουτέστι τὸν κανόνα An.Ox. 4.328
.1 plea, pretext, ground, ἐκ τίνος λ.; A.Ch. 515;ἐξ οὐδενὸς λ. S.Ph. 731
;ἀπὸ παντὸς λ. Id.OC 762
;χὠ λ. καλὸς προσῆν Id.Ph. 352
;σὺν ἀφανεῖ λ. Id.OT 657
(lyr., v.l. λόγων); ἐν ἀφανεῖ λ. Antipho 5.59
;ἐπὶ τοιούτῳ λ. Hdt.6.124
; κατὰ τίνα λ.; on what ground? Pl.R. 366b; οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λ. to no purpose, Id.Prt. 343d; ἐπὶ τίνι λ.; for what reason? X.HG2.2.19; τὸν λ. τοῦτον this ground of complaint, Aeschin.3.228; τίνι δικαίῳ λ.; what just cause is there? Pl.Grg. 512c; τίνι λ.; on what account? Act.Ap.10.29; κατὰ λόγον ἂν ἠνεσχόμην ὑμῶν reason would that.., ib.18.14; λ. ἔχειν, with personal subject, εἶχον ἄν τινα λ. I (i.e. my conduct) would have admitted of an explanation, Pl.Ap. 31b; τὸν ὀρθὸν λ. the true explanation, ib. 34b.b plea, case, in Law or argument (cf. VIII. I), τὸν ἥττω λ. κρείττω ποιεῖν to make the weaker case prevail, ib. 18b, al., Arist.Rh. 1402a24, cf. Ar.Nu. 1042 (pl.); personified, ib. 886, al.;ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς λ. Pl.Phlb. 38a
;ἀνοίσεις τοὺς λ. αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν θεόν LXXEx.18.19
; ἐχειν λ. πρός τινα to have a case, ground of action against.., Act.Ap.19.38.2 statement of a theory, argument, οὐκ ἐμεῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λ. ἀκούσαντας prob. in Heraclit.50; λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης discourse and reflection on reality, Parm.8.50; δηλοῖ οὗτος ὁ λ. ὅτι .. Democr.7; οὐκ ἔχει λόγον it is not arguable, i.e. reasonable, S.El. 466, Pl.Phd. 62d, etc.;ἔχει λ. D.44.32
;οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λ. E.Ba. 202
;δίκασον.. τὸν λ. ἀκούσας Pl.Lg. 696b
; personified, φησὶ οὗτος ὁ λ. ib. 714d, cf. Sph. 238b, Phlb. 50a; ὡς ὁ λ. (sc. λέγει) Arist.EN 1115b12; ὡς ὁ λ. ὁ ὀρθὸς λέγει ib. 1138b20, cf. 29;ὁ λ. θέλει προσβιβάζειν Phld.Rh.1.41
, cf.1.19 S.; ;λ. καθαίρων Aristo Stoic.1.88
; λόγου τυγχάνειν to be explained, Phld.Mus.p.77 K.; ὁ τὸν λ. μου ἀκούων my teaching, Ev.Jo.5.24; ὁ προφητικὸς λ., collect., of VT prophecy, 2 Ep.Pet.1.19: pl.,ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα Heraclit.108
;οὐκ ἐπίθετο τοῖς ἐμοῖς λ. Ar.Nu.73
; of arguments leading to a conclusion ([etym.] ὁ λ.), Pl. Cri. 46b;τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία γέμει τούτων τῶν λ. Id.Ap. 26d
; λ. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, Arist.EN 1095a31; συλλογισμός ἐστι λ. ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν κτλ. Id.APr. 24b18; λ. ἀντίτυπός τε καὶ ἄπορος, of a self-contradictory theory, Plot.6.8.7.b ὁ περὶ θεῶν λ., title of a discourse by Protagoras, D.L.9.54; ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς λ., name of an argument, ib.23;ὁ αὐξόμενος λ. Plu.2.559b
; καταβάλλοντες (sc. λόγοι), title of work by Protagoras, S.E.M.7.60;λ. σοφιστικοί Arist.SE 165a34
, al.;οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λ. Id.Rh. 1417a19
, etc.; οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λ., current outside the Lyceum, Id.Ph. 217b31, al.; Δισσοὶ λ., title of a philosophical treatise (= Dialex.); Λ. καὶ Λογίνα, name of play of Epicharmus, quibble, argument, personified, Ath.8.338d.c in Logic, proposition, whether as premiss or conclusion,πρότασίς ἐστι λ. καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος Arist.APr. 24a16
.d rule, principle, law, as embodying the result of λογισμός, Pi.O.2.22, P.1.35, N.4.31;πείθεσθαι τῷ λ. ὃς ἄν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνηται Pl.Cri. 46b
, cf. c; ἡδονὰς τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λ. ἑπομένας obeying right principles, Id.Lg. 696c; προαιρέσεως [ἀρχὴ] ὄρεξις καὶ λ. ὁ ἕνεκά τινος principle directed to an end, Arist.EN 1139a32; of the final cause,ἀρχὴ ὁ λ. ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν Id.PA 639b15
; ἀποδιδόασι τοὺς λ. καὶ τὰς αἰτίας οὗ ποιοῦσι ἑκάστου ib.18; [τέχνη] ἕξις μετὰ λ. ἀληθοῦς ποιητική Id.EN 1140a10
; ὀρθὸς λ. true principle, right rule, ib. 1144b27, 1147b3, al.; κατὰ λόγον by rule, consistently,ὁ κατὰ λ. ζῶν Pl.Lg. 689d
, cf. Ti. 89d; τὸ κατὰ λ. ζῆν, opp. κατὰ πάθος, Arist.EN 1169a5; κατὰ λ. προχωρεῖν according to plan, Plb.1.20.3.3 law, rule of conduct,ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὁμιλοῦσι λόγῳ Heraclit.72
;πολλοὶ λόγον μὴ μαθόντες ζῶσι κατὰ λόγον Democr.53
; δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λ. τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἄρχουσιν universal principle, Arist.Pol. 1286a17;ὁ νόμος.. λ. ὢν ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ Id.EN 1180a21
; ὁ νόμος.. ἔμψυχος ὢν ἑαυτῷ λ. conscience, Plu. 2.780c; τὸν λ. πρόχειρον ἔχειν precept, Phld.Piet.30, cf. 102;ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ λ. κοινός M.Ant.4.4
.4 thesis, hypothesis, provisional ground, ὡς ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον maintain a thesis, Pl. Prt. 344b; ὑποθέμενος ἑκάστοτε λ. provisionally assuming a proposition, Id.Phd. 100a; τὸν τῆς ὁμοιότητος λ. hypothesis of equivalence, Arist.Cael. 296a20.5 reason, ground,πάντων γινομένων κατὰ τὸν λ. τόνδε Heraclit.1
;οὕτω βαθὺν λ. ἔχει Id.45
; ἐκ λόγου, opp. μάτην, Leucipp. 2;μέγιστον σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λ. Meliss.8
; [ἐμπειρία] οὐκ ἔχει λ. οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει has no grounds for.., Pl.Grg. 465a; μετὰ λόγουτε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας Id.Sph. 265c
; ἡ μετα λόγου ἀληθὴς δόξα ([etym.] ἐπιστήμη) Id.Tht. 201c; λόγον ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λ. proof, Arist. Metaph. 1011a12;οἱ ἁπάντων ζητοῦντες λ. ἀναιροῦσι λ. Thphr.Metaph. 26
.6 formula (wider than definition, but freq. equivalent thereto), term expressing reason,λ. τῆς πολιτείας Pl.R. 497c
; ψυχῆς οὐσία τε καὶ λ. essential definition, Id.Phdr. 245e;ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λ. Id.R. 343a
; τὸν λ. τῆς οὐσίας ib. 534b, cf. Phd. 78d;τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἑνὶ λ. προσειπεῖν Id.Tht. 148d
;ὁ τῆς οἰκοδομήσεως λ. ἔχει τὸν τῆς οἰκίας Arist. PA 646b3
;τεθείη ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λ. Id.Metaph. 1006b5
, cf. 1035b4;πᾶς ὁρισμὸς λ. τίς ἐστι Id.Top. 102a5
; ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λ. κοινός generic definition, Id.de An. 414b23; ἀκριβέστατος λ. specific definition, Id.Pol. 1276b24;πηγῆς λ. ἔχον Ph.2.477
; τὸ ᾠὸν οὔτε ἀρχῆς ἔχει λ. fulfils the function of.., Plu.2.637d; λ. τῆς μίξεως formula, i. e. ratio (cf. supr. II) of combination, Arist.PA 642a22, cf. Metaph. 993a17.7 reason, law exhibited in the world-process, κατὰ λόγον by law,κόσμῳ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λ. ἔχοντα Pl.R. 500c
; κατ τὸν < αὐτὸν αὖ> λ. by the same law, Epich.170.18;ψυχῆς τὸ πᾶν τόδε διοικούσης κατὰ λ. Plot.2.3.13
; esp. in Stoic Philos., the divine order,τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λ. ὃν ἔνιοι εἱμαρμένην καλοῦσιν Zeno Stoic.1.24
; τὸ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν [τῇ ὕλῃ] λ. τὸν θεόν ibid., cf. 42;ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λ. Chrysipp.Stoic.2.264
; λόγος, = φύσει νόμος, Stoic.2.169;κατὰ τὸν κοινὸν θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις λ. M.Ant.7.53
;ὁ ὀρθὸς λ. διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος Chrysipp.Stoic.3.4
: so in Plot.,τὴν φύσιν εἶναι λόγον, ὃς ποιεῖ λ. ἄλλον γέννημα αὑτοῦ 3.8.2
.b σπερματικὸς λ. generative principle in organisms,ὁ θεὸς σπ. λ. τοῦ κόσμου Zeno Stoic.1.28
: usu. in pl., Stoic. 2.205,314,al.;γίνεται τὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ οὐ κατὰ σπερματικούς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λ. περιληπτικούς Plot.3.1.7
, cf.4.4.39: so withoutσπερματικός, ὥσπερ τινὲς λ. τῶν μερῶν Cleanth.Stoic.1.111
;οἱ λ. τῶν ὅλων Ph.1.9
.c in Neo-Platonic Philos., of regulative and formative forces, derived from the intelligible and operative in the sensible universe,ὄντων μειζόνων λ. καὶ θεωρούντων αὑτοὺς ἐγὼ γεγέννημαι Plot.3.8.4
;οἱ ἐν σπέρματι λ. πλάττουσι.. τὰ ζῷα οἷον μικρούς τινας κόσμους Id.4.3.10
, cf.3.2.16,3.5.7; opp. ὅρος, Id.6.7.4;ἀφανεῖς λ. τῆς φύσεως Procl.
in R.1.18 K.; τεχνικοὶ λ. ib.142 K., al.IV inward debate of the soul (cf.λ. ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται Pl.Tht. 189e
( διάλογος in Sph. 263e); ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὁ ἔσω λ. (opp. ὁ ἔξω λ.), Arist.APo. 76b25, 27; ὁ ἐνδιάθετος, opp. ὁ προφορικὸς λ., Stoic.2.43, Ph.2.154),1 thinking, reasoning, τοῦ λ. ἐόντος ξυνοῦ, opp. ἰδία φρόνησις, Heraclit. 2; κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ.. ἔλεγχον test by reflection, Parm.1.36; reflection, deliberation (cf. VI.3),ἐδίδου λόγον ἑωυτῷ περὶ τῆς ὄψιος Hdt.1.209
, cf. 34, S.OT 583, D.45.7; μὴ εἰδέναι.. μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ neither by reasoning nor by experience, Anaxag.7;ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτά, ὄψει δ' οὔ Pl.R. 529d
, cf. Prm. 135e;ὁ λ. ἢ ἡ αἴσθησις Arist.EN 1149a35
,al.; αὐτῷ μόνον τῷ λ. πιστεύειν (opp. αἰσθήσεις), of Parmenides and his school, Aristocl. ap. Eus.PE14.17: hence λόγῳ or τῷ λ. in idea, in thought,τῷ λ. τέμνειν Pl.R. 525e
; τῷ λ. δύο ἐστίν, ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα two in idea, though indistinguishable in fact, Arist. EN 1102a30, cf. GC 320b14, al.; λόγῳ θεωρητά mentally conceived, opp. sensibly perceived, Placit.1.3.5, cf. Demetr.Lac.Herc.1055.20;τοὺς λ. θεωρητοὺς χρόνους Epicur.Ep.1p.19U.
; διὰ λόγου θ. χ. ib.p.10 U.;λόγῳ καταληπτός Phld.Po.5.20
, etc.; ὁ λ. οὕτω αἱρέει analogy proves, Hdt.2.33; ὁ λ. or λ. αἱρέει reasoning convinces, Id.3.45,6.124, cf. Pl.Cri. 48c (but, our argument shows, Lg. 663d): also c. acc. pers., χρᾶται ὅ τι μιν λ. αἱρέει as the whim took him, Hdt.1.132; ἢν μὴ ἡμέας λ. αἱρῇ unless we see fit, Id.4.127, cf. Pl.R. 607b; later ὁ αἱρῶν λ. ordaining reason, Zeno Stoic.1.50, M.Ant.2.5, cf. 4.24, Arr.Epict. 2.2.20, etc.: coupled or contrasted with other functions, καθ' ὕπνον ἐπειδὴ λόγου καὶ φρονήσεως οὐ μετεῖχε since reason and understanding are in abeyance, Pl.Ti. 71d; μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, opp. αἰτία αὐτομάτη, of Nature's processes of production, Id.Sph. 265c; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν embraced by thought with reflection, opp. μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου, Id.Ti. 28a; τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ' ἀληθοῦς λ., opp. τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, ib. 51e, cf. 70d, al.;λ. ἔχων ἑπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν Id.Phlb. 62a
; ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λ. scientific knowledge and right process of thought, Id.Phd. 73a;πᾶς λ. καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν καθόλου Arist.Metaph. 1059b26
;τὸ λόγον ἔχον Id.EN 1102b15
, 1138b9, al.: in sg. and pl., contrasted by Pl. and Arist. as theory, abstract reasoning with outward experience, sts. with depreciatory emphasis on the former,εἰς τοὺς λ. καταφυγόντα Pl.Phd. 99e
; τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα, opp. τὸν ἐν ἔργοις (realities), ib. 100a;τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λ. πιστευτέον Arist.GA 760b31
; γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λ., opp. κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, Id.Ph. 189a4; ἐκ τῶν λ. δῆλον, opp. ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, Id.Mete. 378b20; ἡ τῶν λ. πίστις, opp. ἐκ τῶν ἔργων φανερόν, Id.Pol. 1326a29;ἡ πίστις οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λ. Id.Ph. 262a19
;μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς λ. Id.Pol. 1334a6
; ὁ μὲν λ. τοῦ καθόλου, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τοῦ κατὰ μέρος explanation, opp. perception, Id.Ph. 189a7; ἔσονται τοῖς λ. αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι theory, opp. practice, Epicur.Sent.25; in Logic, of discursive reasoning, opp. intuition, Arist.EN 1142a26, 1143b1; reasoning in general, ib. 1149a26; πᾶς λ. καὶ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις all reasoning and demonstration, Id.Metaph. 1063b10;λ. καὶ φρόνησιν Phld.Mus.p.105
K.; ὁ λ. ἢ λογισμός ibid.; τὸ ἰδεῖν οὐκέτι λ., ἀλλὰ μεῖζον λόγου καὶ πρὸ λόγου, of mystical vision, opp. reasoning, Plot.6.9.10.—Phrases, κατὰ λ. τὸν εἰκότα by probable reasoning, Pl.Ti. 30b;οὔκουν τόν γ' εἰκότα λ. ἂν ἔχοι Id.Lg. 647d
; παρὰ λόγον, opp. κατὰ λ., Arist.Rh.Al. 1429a29, cf. EN 1167b19; cf. παράλογος (but παρὰ λ. unexpectedly, E.Ba. 940).2 reason as a faculty, ὁ λ. ἀνθρώπους κυβερνᾷ [Epich.] 256; [θυμοειδὲς] τοῦ λ. κατήκοον Pl.Ti. 70a
; [θυμὸς] ὑπὸ τοῦ λ. ἀνακληθείς Id.R. 440d
; σύμμαχον τῷ λ. τὸν θυμόν ib. b;πειθαρχεῖ τῷ λ. τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς Arist. EN 1102b26
; ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λ. πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τῷ λ. ib.17;ἐναντίωσις λόγου πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας Plot.4.7.13(8)
;οὐ θυμός, οὐκ ἐπιθυμία, οὐδὲ λ. οὐδέ τις νόησις Id.6.9.11
: freq. in Stoic. Philos. of human Reason, opp. φαντασία, Zeno Stoic.1.39; opp. φύσις, Stoic.2.206; οὐ σοφία οὐδὲ λ. ἐστὶν ἐν [τοῖς ζῴοις] ibid.;τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις ὡς λ. ἔχων λ. μὴ ἔχουσι χρῶ M.Ant.6.23
;ὁ λ. κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς Arr.Epict. 1.3.3
;οἷον [εἰκὼν] λ. ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴ λ. νοῦ Plot.5.1.3
; τὸ τὸν λ. σχεῖν τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν (sc. εὐδαιμονίαν) Procl.in Ti.3.334 D.; also of the reason which pervades the universe, θεῖος λ. [Epich.] 257;τὸν θεῖον λ. καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα S.E.M.7.129
(cf. infr. x).b creative reason,ἀδύνατον ἦν λόγον μὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντα ἐλθεῖν Plot.3.2.14
;ἀρχὴ οὖν λ. καὶ πάντα λ. καὶ τὰ γινόμενα κατ' αὐτόν Id.3.2.15
;οἱ λ. πάντες ψυχαί Id.3.2.18
.2 legend,ἱρὸς λ. Hdt.2.62
, cf. 47, Pi.P.3.80 (pl.);συνθέντες λ. E.Ba. 297
;λ. θεῖος Pl.Phd. 85d
; ἱεροὶ λ., of Orphic rhapsodies, Suid. S.V. Ὀρφεύς.3 tale, story,ἄλλον ἔπειμι λ. Xenoph. 7.1
, cf. Th.1.97, etc.;συνθέτους λ. A.Pr. 686
; σπουδὴν λόγου urgent tidings, E.Ba. 663; ἄλλος λ. 'another story', Pl.Ap. 34e; ὁμολογούμενος ὁ λ. ἐστίν the story is consistent, Isoc.3.27: pl., histories,ἐν τοῖσι Ἀσσυρίοισι λ. Hdt.1.184
, cf. 106, 2.99; so in sg., a historical work, Id.2.123, 6.19,7.152: also in sg., one section of such a work (like later βίβλος), Id.2.38,6.39, cf. VI.3d; so in pl.,ἐν τοῖσι Λιβυκοῖσι λ. Id.2.161
, cf. 1.75,5.22,7.93, 213;ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν λ. Id.5.36
; ὁ πρῶτος λ., of St. Luke's gospel, Act.Ap.1.1: in Pl., opp. μῦθος, as history to legend, Ti. 26e; , cf. Grg. 523a (but μῦθον λέγειν, opp. λόγῳ ( argument)διεξελθεῖν Prt. 320c
, cf. 324d);περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων Arist.Pol. 1336a30
;ὁ λ... μῦθός ἐστι Ael.NA4.34
.4 speech, delivered in court, assembly, etc.,χρήσομαι τῇ τοῦ λ. τάξει ταύτῃ Aeschin.3.57
, cf. Arist.Rh. 1358a38;δικανικοὶ λ. Id.EN 1181a4
;τρία γένη τῶν λ. τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν Id.Rh. 1358b7
;τῷ γράψαντι τὸν λ. Thphr. Char.17.8
, cf.λογογράφος 11
; ἐπιτάφιος λ. funeral oration, Pl.Mx. 236b; esp. of the body of a speech, opp. ἐπίλογος, Arist.Rh. 1420b3; opp. προοίμιον, ib. 1415a12; body of a law, opp. proem, Pl.Lg. 723b; spoken, opp. written word,τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λ. ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον οὗ ὁ γεγραμμένος εἴδωλόν τι Id.Phdr. 276a
; ὁ ἐκ τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθεὶς [λ.] speech read from a roll, ib. 243c; published speech, D.C.40.54; rarely of the speeches in Tragedy ([etym.] ῥήσεις), Arist.Po. 1450b6,9.VI verbal expression or utterance (cf. λέγω (B) 111), rarely a single word, v. infr. b, never in Gramm. signf. of vocable ([etym.] ἔπος, λέξις, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα), usu. of a phrase, cf. IX. 3 (the only sense found in [dialect] Ep.).a pl., without Art., talk,τὸν ἔτερπε λόγοις Il.15.393
;αἱμύλιοι λ. Od.1.56
, h.Merc. 317, Hes.Th. 890, Op.78, 789, Thgn.704, A.R.3.1141; ψευδεῖς Λ., personified, Hes.Th. 229;ἀφροδίσιοι λ. Semon.7.91
;ἀγανοῖσι λ. Pi.P. 4.101
; ὄψον δὲ λ. φθονεροῖσιν tales, Id.N.8.21; σμικροὶ λ. brief words, S.Aj. 1268 (s.v.l.), El. 415; δόκησις ἀγνὼς λόγων bred of talk, Id.OT 681 (lyr.): also in sg., λέγ' εἴ σοι τῷ λ. τις ἡδονή speak if thou delightest in talking, Id.El. 891.b sg., expression, phrase,πρὶν εἰπεῖν ἐσθλὸν ἢ κακὸν λ. Id.Ant. 1245
, cf. E.Hipp. 514;μυρίας ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ Hdt.2.37
; μακρὸς λ. rigmarole, Simon.189, Arist.Metaph. 1091a8; λ. ἠρέμα λεχθεὶς διέθηκε τὸ πόρρω a whispered message, Plot.4.9.3; ἑνὶ λόγῳ to sum up, in brief phrase, Pl.Phdr. 241e, Phd. 65d; concisely, Arist. EN 1103b21 (but also, = ἁπλῶς, περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λ. Id.GC 325a1): pl., λ. θελκτήριοι magic words, E.Hipp. 478; rarely of single words,λ. εὐσύνθετος οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν Arist.Rh. 1406a36
; οὐκ ἀπεκρίθη αὐτῇ λ. answered her not a word, Ev.Matt.15.23.c coupled or contrasted with words expressed or understood signifying act, fact, truth, etc., mostly in a depreciatory sense,λ. ἔργου σκιή Democr. 145
;ὥσπερ μικρὸν παῖδα λόγοις μ' ἀπατᾷς Thgn.254
; λόγῳ, opp. ἔργῳ, Democr.82, etc.;νηπίοισι οὐ λ. ἀλλὰ ξυμφορὴ διδάσκαλος Id.76
;ἔργῳ κοὐ λόγῳ τεκμαίρομαι A.Pr. 338
, cf. S.El.59, OC 782;λόγῳ μὲν λέγουσι.. ἔργῳ δὲ οὐκ ἀποδεικνῦσι Hdt.4.8
;οὐ λόγων, φασίν, ἡ ἀγορὴ δεῖται, χαλκῶν δέ Herod.7.49
;οὔτε λ. οὔτε ἔργῳ Lys.9.14
; λόγοις, opp. ψήφῳ, Aeschin.2.33; opp. νόῳ, Hdt.2.100;οὐ λόγῳ μαθών E.Heracl.5
;ἐκ λόγων, κούφου πράγματος Pl.Lg. 935a
; λόγοισι εἰς τὸ πιθανὸν περιπεπεμμένα ib. 886e, cf. Luc.Anach.19;ἵνα μὴ λ. οἴησθε εἶναι, ἀλλ' εἰδῆτε τὴν ἀλήθειαν Lycurg.23
, cf. D.30.34; opp. πρᾶγμα, Arist.Top. 146a4; opp. βία, Id.EN 1179b29, cf. 1180a5; opp. ὄντα, Pl.Phd. 100a; opp. γνῶσις, 2 Ep.Cor.11.6; λόγῳ in pretence, Hdt.1.205, Pl.R. 361b, 376d, Ti. 27a, al.; λόγου ἕνεκα merely as a matter of words,ἄλλως ἕνεκα λ. ἐλέγετο Id.Cri. 46d
; λόγου χάριν, opp. ὡς ἀληθῶς, Arist.Pol. 1280b8; but also, let us say, for instance, Id.EN 1144a33, Plb.10.46.4, Phld. Sign.29, M.Ant.4.32; λόγου ἕνεκα let us suppose, Pl.Tht. 191c; ἕως λόγου, μέχρι λ., = Lat. verbo tenus, Plb.10.24.7, Epict.Ench.16: sts. without depreciatory force, the antithesis or parallelism being verbal (cf. 'word and deed'),λόγῳ τε καὶ σθένει S.OC68
;ἔν τε ἔργῳ καὶ λ. Pl.R. 382e
, cf. D.S.13.101, Ev.Luc.24.19, Act.Ap.7.22, Paus.2.16.2; ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον, opp. τὰ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων, Th. 1.22.2 common talk, report, tradition,ὡς λ. ἐν θνητοῖσιν ἔην Batr. 8
;λ. ἐκ πατέρων Alc.71
;οὐκ ἔστ' ἔτυμος λ. οὗτος Stesich.32
;διξὸς λέγεται λ. Hdt.3.32
;λ. ὑπ' Αἰγυπτίων λεγόμενος Id.2.47
; νέον [λ.] tidings, S.Ant. 1289 (lyr.); τὰ μὲν αὐτοὶ ὡρῶμεν, τὰ δὲ λόγοισι ἐπυνθανόμεθα by hearsay, Hdt.2.148: also in pl., ἐν γράμμασιν λόγοι κείμενοι traditions, Pl.Lg. 886b.b rumour,ἐπὶ παντὶ λ. ἐπτοῆσθαι Heraclit. 87
; αὐδάεις λ. voice of rumour, B.14.44; περὶ θεῶν διῆλθεν ὁ λ. ὅτι .. Th.6.46; λ. παρεῖχεν ὡς .. Plb.3.89.3; ἐξῆλθεν ὁ λ. οὗτος εῖς τινας ὅτι .. Ev.Jo.21.23, cf. Act.Ap.11.22; fiction, Ev.Matt.28.15.c mention, notice, description, οὐκ ὕει λόγου ἄξιον οὐδέν worth mentioning, Hdt.4.28, cf. Plb.1.24.8, etc.; ἔργα λόγου μέζω beyond expression, Hdt.2.35; κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου beyond description, Th. 2.50;μείζω ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λ. τις ἂν εἴποι D.6.11
.d the talk one occasions, repute, mostly in good sense, good report, praise, honour (cf. supr. 1.4),πολλὰ φέρειν εἴωθε λ... πταίσματα Thgn.1221
;λ. ἐσλὸν ἀκοῦσαι Pi.I.5(4).13
;πλέονα.. λ. Ὀδυσσέος ἢ πάθαν Id.N.7.21
;ἵνα λ. σε ἔχῃ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθός Hdt.7.5
, cf. 9.78; Τροίαν.. ἧς ἁπανταχοῦ λ. whose fame, story fills the world, E.IT 517;οὐκ ἂν ἦν λ. σέθεν Id.Med. 541
: less freq. in bad sense, evil report, λ. κακόθρους, κακός, S. Aj. 138 (anap.), E.Heracl. 165: pl., λόγους ψιθύρους πλάσσων slanders, S.Aj. 148 (anap.).e λ. ἐστί, ἔχει, κατέχει, the story goes, c. acc. et inf.,ἔστ τις λ. τὰν Ἀρετὰν ναίειν Simon.58.1
, cf. S.El. 417; λ. μὲν ἔστ' ἀρχαῖος ὡς .. Id.Tr.1; λ. alone, E.Heracl.35;ὡς λ. A.Supp. 230
, Pl. Phlb. 65c, etc.;λ. ἐστί Hdt.7.129
,9.26, al.;λ. αἰὲν ἔχει S.OC 1573
(lyr.); ὅσον ὁ λ. κατέχει tradition prevails, Th.1.10: also with a personal subject in the reverse construction. Κλεισθένης λ. ἔχει τὴν Πυθίην ἀναπεῖσαι has the credit of.., Hdt.5.66, cf. Pl.Epin. 987b, 988b;λ. ἔχοντα σοφίας Ep.Col.2.23
, v.supr.1.4.3 discussion, debate, deliberation,πολλὸς ἦν ἐν τοῖσι λ. Hdt.8.59
;συνελέχθησαν οἱ Μῆδοι ἐς τὠυτὸ καὶ ἐδίδοσαν σφίσι λόγον, λέγοντες περὶ τῶν κατηκόντων Id.1.97
;οἱ Πελασγοὶ ἑωυτοῖσι λόγους ἐδίδοσαν Id.6.138
; ;οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης λ. Aeschin.2.74
; τοῖς ἔξωθεν λ. πεπλήρωκε τὸν λ. [Plato] has filled his dialogue with extraneous discussions, Arist.Pol. 1264b39;τὸ μῆκος τῶν λ. D.Chr.7.131
; μεταβαίνων ὁ λ. εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται our debate, Arist.EN 1097a24; ὁ παρὼν λ. ib. 1104a11; θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λ. ἐστί discussion, Pl.Ap. 26b, cf. Tht. 184a, M.Ant.8.32; τῷ λ. διελθεῖν, διϊέναι, Pl.Prt. 329c, Grg. 506a, etc.; τὸν λ. διεξελθεῖν conduct the debate, Id.Lg. 893a; ξυνελθεῖν ἐς λόγον confer, Ar.Eq. 1300: freq. in pl., ἐς λόγους συνελθόντες parley, Hdt. 1.82; ἐς λ. ἐλθεῖν τινι have speech with, ib.86;ἐς λ. ἀπικέσθαι τινί Id.2.32
;διὰ λόγων ἰέναι E.Tr. 916
;ἐμαυτῇ διὰ λ. ἀφικόμην Id.Med. 872
;ἐς λ. ἄγειν τινά X.HG4.1.2
;κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας Arist.EN 1170b12
.b right of discussion or speech, ἢ 'πὶ τῷ πλήθει λ.; S.OC 66; λ. αἰτήσασθαι ask leave to speak, Th.3.53;λ. διδόναι X.HG5.2.20
; οὐ προυτέθη σφίσιν λ. κατὰ τὸν νόμον ib.1.7.5;λόγου τυχεῖν D.18.13
, cf. Arist.EN 1095b21, Plb.18.52.1;οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους ἀποστεροῦντες Arist.Pol. 1260b5
;δοῦλος πέφυκας, οὐ μέτεστί σοι λόγου Trag.Adesp.304
;διδόντας λ. καὶ δεχομένους ἐν τῷ μέρει Luc.Pisc.8
: hence, time allowed for a speech,ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λ. And.1.26
,al.;ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λ. Pl.Ap. 34a
;οὐκ ἐλάττω λ. ἀνήλωκε D.18.9
.c dialogue, as a form of philosophical debate,ἵνα μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λ. ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ Pl. Cra. 430d
;πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λ. ποιεῖσθαι Id.Prt. 348a
: hence, dialogue as a form of literature,οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ λ. Arist.Po. 1447b11
, Rh. 1417a20; cf. διάλογος.d section, division of a dialogue or treatise (cf. v. 3),ὁ πρῶτος λ. Pl.Prm. 127d
; ὁ πρόσθεν, ὁ παρελθὼν λ., Id.Phlb. 18e, 19b;ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λ. Arist.PA 682a3
; ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λ. in the discussion of motion (i. e. Ph.bk.8), Id.GC 318a4;ἐν τῷ περὶ ἐπαίνου λ. Phld.Rh.1.219
; branch, department, division of a system of philosophy,τὴν φρόνησιν ἐκ τριῶν συνεστηκέναι λ., τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν καὶ τῶν λογικῶν Chrysipp.Stoic.2.258
.e in pl., literature, letters, Pl.Ax. 365b, Epin. 975d, D.H.Comp.1,21 (but, also in pl., treatises, Plu.2.16c);οἱ ἐπὶ λόγοις εὐδοκιμώτατοι Hdn.6.1.4
; Λόγοι, personified, AP9.171 (Pall.).VII a particular utterance, saying:1 divine utterance, oracle, Pi.P.4.59;λ. μαντικοί Pl. Phdr. 275b
;οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λ. Pl.Ap. 20e
;ὁ λ. τοῦ θεοῦ Apoc.1.2
,9.2 proverb, maxim, saying, Pi.N.9.6, A.Th. 218; ὧδ' ἔχει λ. ib. 225; τόνδ' ἐκαίνισεν λ. ὡς .. Critias 21, cf. Pl.R. 330a, Ev.Jo.4.37;ὁ παλαιὸς λ. Pl.Phdr. 240c
, cf. Smp. 195b, Grg. 499c, Lg. 757a, 1 Ep.Ti.1.15, Plu.2.1082e, Luc.Alex.9, etc.;τὸ τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοῦτο Herod.2.45
, cf. D.Chr.66.24, Luc.JTr.3, Alciphr.3.56, etc.: pl., Arist.EN 1147a21.4 express resolution, κοινῷ λ. by common consent, Hdt.1.141,al.; ἐπὶ λ. τοιῷδε, ἐπ' ᾧ τε .. on the following terms, Id.7.158, cf. 9.26;ἐνδέξασθαι τὸν λ. Id.1.60
, cf. 9.5; λ. ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην a greedy proposal, Id.7.158: freq. in pl., terms, conditions, Id.9.33, etc.5 word of command, behest, A.Pr.17,40 (both pl.), Pers. 363;ἀνθρώπους πιθανωτέρους ποιεῖν λόγῳ X.Oec.13.9
;ἐξέβαλε τὰ πνεύματα λόγῳ Ev.Matt.8.16
; οἱ δέκα λ. the ten Commandments, LXX Ex.34.28, Ph.1.496.VIII thing spoken of, subject-matter (cf. 111.1 b and 2),λ. τοῦτον ἐάσομεν Thgn.1055
; προπεπυσμένος πάντα λ. the whole matter, Hdt.1.21, cf. 111; τὸν ἐόντα λ. the truth of the matter, ib.95, 116; μετασχεῖν τοῦ λ. to be in the secret, ib. 127;μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸν λ. τοῦτον εῐπῃς Id.8.65
; τίς ἦν λ.; S.OT 684 ( = πρᾶγμα, 699); περί τινος λ. διελεγόμεθα subject, question, Pl.Prt. 314c; [τὸ προοίμιον] δεῖγμα τοῦ λ. case, Arist.Rh. 1415a12, cf. 111.1b; τέλος δὲ παντὸς τοῦ λ. ψηφίζονται the end of the matter was that.., Aeschin.3.124;οὐκ ἔστεξε τὸν λ. Plb.8.12.5
;οὐκ ἔστι σοι μερὶς οὐδὲ κλῆρος ἐν τῷ λ. τούτῳ Act.Ap.8.21
;ἱκανὸς αὐτῷ ὁ λ. Pl.Grg. 512c
; οὐχ ὑπολείπει [Γοργίαν] ὁ λ. matter for talk, Arist.Rh. 1418a35;μηδένα λ. ὑπολιπεῖν Isoc.4.146
; πρὸς λόγον to the point, apposite,οὐδὲν πρὸς λ. Pl.Phlb. 42e
, cf. Prt. 344a;ἐὰν πρὸς λ. τι ᾖ Id.Phlb. 33c
; alsoπρὸς λόγου Id.Grg. 459c
(s. v.l.).b in Art, subject of a painting,ζωγραφίας λόγοι Philostr.VA 6.10
;λ. τῆς γραφῆς Id.Im.1.25
.IX expression, utterance, speech regarded formally, τὸ ἀπὸ [ψυχῆς] ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου λ., opp. διάνοια, Pl.Sph. 263e; intelligent utterance, opp. φωνή, Arist.Pol. 1253a14;λ. ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην Id.Int. 16b26
, cf. Diog.Bab.Stoic.3.213; ὅθεν (from the heart)ὁ λ. ἀναπέμπεται Stoic.2.228
, cf. 244; Protagoras was nicknamed λόγος, Hsch. ap. Sch.Pl.R. 600c, Suid.;λόγου πειθοῖ Democr.181
: in pl., eloquence, Isoc.3.3,9.11;τὴν ἐν λόγοις εὐρυθμίαν Epicur.Sent.Pal.5p.69
v. d. M.; λ. ἀκριβής precise language, Ar.Nu. 130 (pl.), cf. Arist.Rh. 1418b1;τοῦ μὴ ᾀδομένου λ. Pl.R. 398d
; ἡδυσμένος λ., of rhythmical language set to music, Arist.Po. 1449b25; ἐν παντὶ λ. in all manner of utterance, 1 Ep.Cor.1.5; ἐν λόγοις in orations, Arist.Po. 1459a13; λ. γελοῖοι, ἀσχήμονες, ludicrous, improper speech, Id.SE 182b15, Pol. 1336b14.2 of various modes of expression, esp. artistic and literary, ;ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν ᾠδαῖς X.Cyr.1.4.25
, cf. Pl.Lg. 835b; prose, opp. ποίησις, Id.R. 390a; opp. ψιλομετρία, Arist.Po. 1448a11; opp. ἔμμετρα, ib. 1450b15 (pl.); τῷ λ. τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων (sc. τὸ ἰαμβεῖον)ὁμοιότατον εἶναι Id.Rh. 1404a31
; in full, ψιλοὶ λ. prose, ib. b33 (but ψιλοὶ λ., = arguments without diagrams, Pl.Tht. 165a); λ. πεζοί, opp. ποιητική, D.H.Comp.6; opp. ποιήματα, ib.15;κοινὰ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ λόγων Phld.Po.5.7
; πεζὸς λ. ib.27, al.b of the constituents of lyric or dramatic poetry, words,τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν.. λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ Pl.R. 398d
; opp. πρᾶξις, Arist.Po. 1454a18; dramatic dialogue, opp. τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ, ib. 1449a17.3 Gramm., phrase, complex term, opp. ὄνομα, Id.SE 165a13; λ. ὀνοματώδης noun- phrase, Id.APo. 93b30, cf. Rh. 1407b27; expression, D.H.Th.2, Demetr.Eloc.92.b sentence, complete statement, "ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει λόγον εἶναί φῃς.. ἐλάχιστόν τε καὶ πρῶτον Pl.Sph. 262c
;λ. αὐτοτελής A.D.Synt.3.6
, D.T.634.1; ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ to be expressed in a sentence, Pl.Tht. 202b; λ. ἔχειν to be capable of being so expressed, ib. 201e, cf. Arist.Rh. 1404b26.c language, τὰ τοῦ λ. μέρη parts of speech, Chrysipp.Stoic.2.31, S.E.M.9.350, etc.;τὰ μόρια τοῦ λ. D.H.Comp.6
;μέρος λ. D.T.633.26
, A.D.Pron.4.6, al. (but ἓν μέρος <τοῦ cod.> λόγου one word, Id.Synt.340.10, cf. 334.22); περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ λ., title of work by Chrysippus.X the Word or Wisdom of God, personified as his agent in creation and world-government,ὁ παντοδύναμός σου λ. LXX Wi.18.15
;ὁ ἐκ νοὸς φωτεινὸς λ. υἱὸς θεοῦ Corp.Herm.1.6
, cf. Plu.2.376c; λ. θεοῦ δι' οὗ κατεσκευάσθη [ὁ κόσμος] Ph.1.162; τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίας· ἡ δέ ἐστιν ὁ θεοῦ λ. ib.56; λ. θεῖος.. εἰκὼν θεοῦ ib. 561, cf. 501; τὸν τομέα τῶν συμπάντων [θεοῦ] λ. ib. 492; τὸν ἄγγελον ὅς ἐστι λ. ib. 122: in NT identified with the person of Christ,ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λ. Ev.Jo.1.1
, cf. 14, 1 Ep.Jo.2.7, Apoc.19.13;ὁ λ. τῆς ζωῆς 1 Ep.Jo.1.1
. -
16 raisonnement
raisonnement [ʀεzɔnmɑ̃]masculine nouna. ( = activité) reasoning uncount ; ( = façon de réfléchir) way of thinking ; ( = cheminement de la pensée) thought process• raisonnement économique/politique economic/political thinkingb. ( = argumentation) argument* * *ʀɛzɔnmɑ̃nom masculin1) ( suite d'arguments) reasoning [U] ( sur about)2) ( type de pensée) thinking•Phrasal Verbs:* * *ʀɛzɔnmɑ̃ nm1) (= logique, mode de pensée) reasoning2) (= argumentation) argument, reasoningJ'ai du mal à suivre son raisonnement. — I have difficulty following his reasoning.
* * *raisonnement nm1 ( suite d'arguments) reasoning ¢ (sur about); un raisonnement confus/solide confused/sound reasoning; les lacunes de ton raisonnement the gaps in your reasoning; suivre le raisonnement de qn to follow sb's reasoning; tous les raisonnements sous-jacents all the underlying reasoning; faire le même raisonnement pour to apply the same reasoning to; selon le même raisonnement by the same argument; faire le raisonnement que to argue that; il tient le raisonnement suivant his argument is as follows; je ne tiens pas le même raisonnement I have a different way of reasoning; tu ne feras jamais rien avec ce genre de raisonnement you won't get anywhere with that sort of thinking;2 ( opération de la pensée) reasoning; raisonnement logique/analogique/pratique logical/analogical/practical reasoning; mode/forme /méthode de raisonnement way/form/method of reasoning; fondé sur le raisonnement based on reason;3 ( type de pensée) thinking; raisonnement économique/politique economic/political thinking.raisonnement par l'absurde reductio ad absurdum.[rɛzɔnmɑ̃] nom masculin1. [faculté, réflexion]raisonnement déductif/inductif deductive/inductive reasoning2. [argumentation] reasoningla conclusion de mon raisonnement est la suivante after careful thought, I have come to the following conclusion -
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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18 el porqué de
= the reason behind, the thinking behind, the reasoning behind, the idea behindEx. In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.Ex. This article describes the thinking behind a new book event for countries in the Pacific region which will take place in May 93.Ex. Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer.Ex. The idea behind metadata is that there is some Third Way of organizing and giving access to electronic resources that is approximately half way between cataloguing (expensive and effective) and keyword searching (cheap and ineffective).* * *= the reason behind, the thinking behind, the reasoning behind, the idea behindEx: In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.
Ex: This article describes the thinking behind a new book event for countries in the Pacific region which will take place in May 93.Ex: Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer.Ex: The idea behind metadata is that there is some Third Way of organizing and giving access to electronic resources that is approximately half way between cataloguing (expensive and effective) and keyword searching (cheap and ineffective). -
19 la filosofía de
= the reason behind, the reasoning behindEx. In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.Ex. Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer.* * *= the reason behind, the reasoning behindEx: In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.
Ex: Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer. -
20 las razones de
= the reason behind, the thinking behind, the reasoning behind, the idea behindEx. In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.Ex. This article describes the thinking behind a new book event for countries in the Pacific region which will take place in May 93.Ex. Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer.Ex. The idea behind metadata is that there is some Third Way of organizing and giving access to electronic resources that is approximately half way between cataloguing (expensive and effective) and keyword searching (cheap and ineffective).* * *= the reason behind, the thinking behind, the reasoning behind, the idea behindEx: In addition, their involvement in the planning process will go a long way towards allaying any fears over automation and will ensure that staff are aware of the reasons behind the decision to automate.
Ex: This article describes the thinking behind a new book event for countries in the Pacific region which will take place in May 93.Ex: Each library response should be signed by the librarian and should show the reasoning behind the answer.Ex: The idea behind metadata is that there is some Third Way of organizing and giving access to electronic resources that is approximately half way between cataloguing (expensive and effective) and keyword searching (cheap and ineffective).
См. также в других словарях:
Reasoning — (Roget s Thesaurus) < N PARAG:Reasoning >N GRP: N 1 Sgm: N 1 1 =>{ant,477,} reasoning ratiocination rationalism Sgm: N 1 dialectics dialectics induction generalization GRP: N 2 Sgm: N 2 discussion discussion comment Sgm: N 2 … English dictionary for students
Reasoning — is the cognitive process of looking for reasons for beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings. [ Kirwin, Christopher. 1995. Reasoning . In Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford University Press: p. 748] Humans… … Wikipedia
Reasoning — Rea son*ing, n. 1. The act or process of adducing a reason or reasons; manner of presenting one s reasons. [1913 Webster] 2. That which is offered in argument; proofs or reasons when arranged and developed; course of argument. [1913 Webster] His… … The Collaborative International Dictionary of English
reasoning — (n.) late 14c., exercise of the power of reason; act or process of thinking logically; an instance of this; see REASON (Cf. reason) (v.) … Etymology dictionary
reasoning — Any process of drawing a conclusion from a set of premises may be called a process of reasoning. If the conclusion concerns what to do, the process is called practical reasoning, otherwise pure or theoretical reasoning. Evidently such processes… … Philosophy dictionary
Process calculus — In computer science, the process calculi (or process algebras) are a diverse family of related approaches to formally modelling concurrent systems. Process calculi provide a tool for the high level description of interactions, communications, and … Wikipedia
reasoning — noun ADJECTIVE ▪ careful, sound ▪ circular, faulty, flawed, specious (formal) ▪ underlying ▪ … Collocations dictionary
reasoning — I (New American Roget s College Thesaurus) Process of understanding Nouns 1. reasoning, ratiocination, rationalism, deduction, dialectics, induction, generalization, logic, synthesis, syncretism, analysis, rationalization, discursive or circular… … English dictionary for students
reasoning — rea|son|ing [ riznıŋ ] noun uncount the process of thinking about something in an intelligent and sensible way in order to make a decision or form an opinion: It s difficult to understand the judge s reasoning in this case. reasoning behind: The… … Usage of the words and phrases in modern English
reasoning — UK [ˈriːz(ə)nɪŋ] / US [ˈrɪz(ə)nɪŋ] noun [uncountable] the process of thinking about something in an intelligent sensible way in order to make a decision or form an opinion It s difficult to understand the judge s reasoning in this case. reasoning … English dictionary
reasoning — rea|son|ing [ˈri:zənıŋ] n [U] a process of thinking carefully about something in order to make a judgment scientific/logical/legal reasoning reasoning behind ▪ What is the reasoning behind this decision? … Dictionary of contemporary English